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1 This may resemble the question that kickstarted the field of everyday aesthetics, when the 
main concern was to find methodological arguments able to justify the need for an analysis of 
everydayness. See for example: Light and Smith (2005); Kupfer (1983); Saito (2008, 2017); 
Yuedi and Carter (2014).
What Makes Things Banal 
Lukáš Makky
In this paper, I investigate the origins of banality and the reasons why some phenomena appear banal to 
us. I discuss the issue by analysing three interrelated areas of aesthetic investigation: artworks, everyday 
objects, and banal things. By identifying the source of banality, my goal is to understand what makes 
banal things different from other kinds of things. I consider the following questions: 1) when, why, and 
how does an object become banal?; 2) what happens when something becomes banal?; 3) are banal 
things aesthetically appealing? Drawing on Wolfgang Welsch’s  notion of anesthetization and Walter 
Benjamin’s account of aura, I argue that banality consists in the absence of both an ontological and an 
axiological character in objects, which makes them appear trivial or insignificant to us. I  conclude by 
showing that although art, everydayness, and banality represent different aesthetic dimensions, objects 
constantly move from one of these dimensions to the other.  |  Keywords: Banality, Art, Everyday 
Aesthetics, Aura, Anesthetization
1. Introduction
Small and insignificant things, phenomena, and moments ‘co-create’ our daily 
life and the world as we know it. They are an immanent part of our experience 
and despite this, we mostly don’t care about them. We deem such things as 
banal as if they make up only minor, imperceptible details of the environment 
where the important things or the things that deserve our attention are set. 
This may cast doubts on the meaningfulness of my examination at its very 
beginning: why, indeed, should one need to investigate banal things and search 
for their origins if these things are actually banal?1
Jan Mukařovský (1966) answers this question clearly enough when he claims 
that any object, activity, or fact can be the carrier of an aesthetic function, and 
therefore can be aesthetically interesting and significant. Looking at banal 
This paper is part of the project ‘The Challenges of 21st-century Aesthetics’ and has been supported 
using public funds provided by the Slovak Arts Council. The study reflects the views of the Author 
only. The Council cannot be held responsible for any information contained therein.
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2 According to Migašová (2016, p. 34) “one crucial aspect of banality is a sense of mundaness, 
triviality, insignificance, irrelevance, paltriness.”
3 For a philosophical and aesthetic account on the issue of intentions, see Livingston (2007, 
2013).
4 Pragmatist approaches explain thoroughly the relation of art to life, and in some cases extend 
the analysis to the role of everyday life in the arts (Dewey, 1980; Shusterman, 2000).
things from Mukařovský’s  perspective is refreshing and can redeem banal 
things from their usual status2. Mukařovský’s  thesis, however, can also be 
understood slightly differently, as if he was saying that everything that 
surrounds us can be a  potential object of aesthetic inquiry, even though it 
doesn’t need to be significant in itself. This, I think, is the way we should look 
at banality: as composed of marginal things whose character, substance, 
impact, and scope can be fundamental for us, but whose existence we 
commonly neglect.
This gives us a compelling reason to explore the nature of banal things and to 
search for what makes such things banal in the first place. We can assume that 
banal things are not intentionally created to be banal: they become banal.3 
Something internal or external is the cause of their banalization. In this paper, 
I will search for the roots of banality through reference to three related areas of 
aesthetic investigation. I will focus on a) art, b) everyday objects, and c) banal 
things, activities, and phenomena. Everyday objects and banal things will not 
be regarded as derivative or secondary forms of art but rather as subjects of 
aesthetic investigation in themselves, although I  recognize that there is 
a connection between art and these other aesthetic objects.4 
An important question in this regard will be whether some quality makes banal 
things different from other things so  that we can identify the source of their 
banality somewhere in their nature. To address this question, I  will consider 
the following interrelated issues: 1) when, why, and how does something 
become banal? 2) what happens when something becomes banal? 3) can banal 
objects be aesthetically appealing?
This will lead me to quest for the basic reasons that lead us to consider banal 
things as insignificant and replaceable. 
2. Anesthetics, Aura and Art 
Banal things differ from other objects in something exceptionally trivial; that 
is why we do  not intentionally pay attention to them. This aspect can be 
a  determining factor in order to better understand our relationship with 
banality. An important point is that banal things represent a set of objects that 
we, as recipients, are not even able to perceive, because we tend to be 
indifferent or perceptively immune towards them. In other words, we cannot 
even see them. 
This idea has been notably examined by Wolfgang Welsch (1990) in his 
Aesthetics and anesthetics. Welsch addresses the issue by considering what he 
calls the phenomenon of “saturation of aesthetic facts” that takes place in the 
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5 Jana Migašová (2016) surveys the possibility of the presence of banality in art.
postmodern era of hyper-aestheticization. This phenomenon gives rise to 
a process of estrangement leading the recipient to ‘move’ the perceived object 
to a  sort of ‘grey zone’ where the object is alienated from the domain of 
aesthetics and even from the domain of perception in general. The recipient, 
however, doesn’t have any other choice, because too many impulses are 
attacking her senses from everywhere and making a  selection between these 
impulses would request too much energy. That is the reason why she just 
simply stops ‘feeling’ or starts to be blind as regards aesthetic stimuli. 
According to Welsch, anesthetization can depend on two related factors. In the 
first place, the fact that (a) we get used to a condition in which certain objects 
do  not cause any mental or perceptual motion in us so  that we do  not even 
expect that these objects can arise something anymore. This estrangement is 
partly caused by the number of images surrounding us and the fact that such 
images are not real but rather mediate reality by distorting or even alienating it 
(Welsch, 1990). 
In the second place, the fact that (b) the reality we perceive has nothing special 
or particularly significant to offer, and although it may engender some 
aesthetic interest in us, this interest can only be superficial and transient.
One could blame modernism for this because estrangement can be regarded as 
an effect of modernity and anaesthetization as an experience the modern 
recipient goes through (Jameson, 1991, p. 124). But in this case as in many 
others, modernism would be subject to an unjustified accusation. Banality is 
indeed not merely a  consequence of modernity, but something that has to 
do with how things are in themselves. 
Therefore, although Welsch’s  account of anaesthetization offers us some 
important conceptual tools to understand the phenomenon, his explanation 
seems to me not sufficient to account for how banal things are created. We 
need to look somewhere else if we want to find an answer to this question. My 
suggestion is that we turn to the idea that banal objects can be the result of 
anesthetization because there is something in their essence, some 
fundamental quality or attribute, that these objects lack, and that makes them 
banal in the first place and justify why we overlook them. If this is the case, 
then one way to understand what this lacking quality may be, I contend, is to 
call into question the notion of aura and its relationship to aesthetic value.
2.1 Art
Nothing seems more distant to banality than art itself: banality looks like an 
antonym of art both at the semantic and at the aesthetic level. This, however, 
can only be true to the extent that we don’t accept banal things as an 
inspiration or material for art, at least when art is understood according to the 
mimetic paradigm5. 
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6 There are many approaches concerning the question of how to define art and many types of 
definitions have been proposed, of an anti-essentialist, analytical, functional and procedural, 
intentional, historical, institutional, and cluster type. See especially Beardsley (1983); Danto 
(1964); Dickie (1974); Gaut (2000); Goodman (1977; Levinson (1979) and Weitz (1956). For an 
insightful historical analysis of the issue see Davies (1991).
Here it may be good to introduce a  differentiation that will be further 
discussed later on in this paper, namely, that between banal objects and 
everyday objects. One example may be useful to grasp the relevance of this 
difference. Typically, artists choose to depict things that, in their eyes, are 
extraordinary. Such things, however, do  not need to be extraordinary in 
themselves or for everybody else. 
This gives me a chance to respond to an observation made by Tufan Acil, who 
commented on a previous version of this paper during the colloquium Banality, 
Aesthetics and Everyday Life (Presov, October 8th, 2020). In his commentary, Acil 
refers to Heidegger’s  famous example of ‘Van Gogh’s  shoes’. This example, 
I  think, shows us that even something seemingly unimportant, like a  pair of 
shoes, can be inspiring for an artist, and remain banal for everybody else. The 
shoes depicted by Van Gogh are just tools and even worn-out tools, but they 
are transformed when they are represented on the canvas. However, I  don’t 
think these shoes become less banal just because they are now the object of 
a work of art. Although they may become aesthetically intriguing as a result of 
this artistic transposition, they still retain their essential banality. In light of 
this example, we can assume that even though the relationship between art 
and banality cannot be characterized in terms of a mere opposition, there is no 
doubt that art works on a  completely different level than everyday life. 
Whatever art is in its nature, it cannot be just a matter of habits, of things that 
we can encounter anywhere and anytime, but must be something that 
significantly differs from other things. 
Of course, thinking that there must be an intrinsic or essential difference 
between art and other things seems to lead us back to an elitist artistic 
approach (Dubuffet, 1988; Shusterman, 2000) such as that pursued by classical 
aesthetics. Today, it is clear that the borders between different domains, 
especially between the domain of aesthetics and that of art, need to be 
reconsidered, for they are much more elusive (see Jameson, 1991) than we 
thought. But we do not need to accept any essentialist definition of art to claim 
that there must be something that distinguishes art from banal things.6
One way to clarify the issue is to refer to Walter Benjamin’s famous discussion 
on the notion of aura in his The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction (1969). According to Benjamin, the existence of art is dependent 
on two categories: (1) space and (2) time, which guarantee the originality of an 
artwork (Benjamin, 1969, p. 3), represent the proof of its authenticity (see 
Dadejik, 2009; Šábik, 2009), and differentiate the original from its counterfeit 
or reproduction. 
The notion of aura doesn’t represent a defining criterion for Benjamin, and he 
does not use it to define art.  Rather, he believes that since it represents the 
here and now of a work, the aura guarantees the unique being of an artwork at 
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7 This could bring us to reconsider the distinction between art and craft, not just in a 
terminological but also in an axiological and ontological sense (see for example Giombini, 
2017; Kopčáková, 2020).
the place of its existence (Benjamin, 1969). “The presence of the original is the 
prerequisite to the concept of authenticity” (Benjamin, 1969, p. 3). Indeed, the 
authenticity of a  certain thing cannot be repeated or copied. Aura, which is 
interpreted by Benjamin as “a  peculiar web of space and time: the unique 
manifestation of a distance, however near it may be” (Benjamin, 1972, p. 20), is 
the proof of this unrepeatable authenticity and the unviolated authority of the 
artwork.
Aura allows for an overcoming of space and time and arouses in the recipients 
the feeling that art in itself is something strange, demanding and challenging. 
This can add some distance in the interaction between the recipient and the 
artwork, and since interacting with art is not always simple, one can wonder 
whether Benjamin’s  recourse to aura complicates an already complicated 
situation rather than clarifying it. In Benjamin’s text, aura sometimes seems to 
work more mystically than aesthetically and this makes the process of 
aesthetic perception and understanding of art to become even less clear and 
approachable from the point of view of recipients.  
But for Benjamin aura is primarily inner energy, a  power that preserves an 
artwork’s  uniqueness and irreplaceability and assures its specific place in 
history and culture. It is an evidence of originality and novelty and corresponds 
to the value the artwork acquires because of the time and space of its origin. 
The primacy of an artwork also justifies its position in art history. 
To the same extent, when we appreciate theater plays, paintings, or films we 
judge them based on their inventiveness and novelty. As recipients, we are 
willing to admit that new artworks can be technically good7 but when they copy 
older artworks, we generally dismiss them as derivative, unoriginal, and so on. 
Thus, despite all the transformations happening in the modern or post-modern 
world and despite “the end of the concept of the masterpiece” (Jameson, 1991), 
the uniqueness of an artwork still has a fundamental role for us. 
In Benjamin’s understanding, the evidence of this uniqueness is aura itself, an 
element which specifies or rather identifies the origin of an artifact by tracing 
it back to a  moment of the past, while at the same time reflecting its 
‘existence’. Aura is thus a guarantee of value, but this value cannot be defined, 
so  it is not possible to compare the aura of two different artifacts. Aura is 
indeed an absolute, but it can be more or less present, even if it can be more or 
less present in a certain object.
An important thing is that authenticity, as a quality generated by the aura, is 
non-reproducible. This is what Benjamin (1969, p. 3) intends when stating 
that: “The whole sphere of authenticity is outside technical – and, of course 
not only technical – reproducibility”. This does not only mean that 
authenticity cannot be reproduced, but also that the artwork loses its 
uniqueness when reproduced, that is, it loses its essence or value which are 
aspects of aura. 
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8 An interesting inquiry in the issue of the images of the past (or past images) is offered by 
Didi-Huberman (2005) and Aldhouse-Green (2004). A more classical and traditional approach, 
on the other hand, can be found in Gadamer (2004) and Ingarden (1946).
Authenticity cannot be the content of technical reproduction: the process of 
reproduction gives rise to something ontologically new but it cannot recreate 
aura. In this sense, with the process of reproduction, the artwork itself fades 
away as it loses its main constituent, namely, its originality or its aura. 
Benjamin’s core criticism of mechanical reproduction is based exactly on this 
impossibility to transfer ‘the substance’ of an artwork through reproduction. 
Technical reproduction causes the aura to vanish or be dissolved in fragments, 
transferring the object to a  dimension without aura. Importantly, this also 
creates the conditions for banal things to be produced in the first place as 
changeable and undistinguished objects deprived of any specific identity. 
3. The Other (True) Aura
Walter Benjamin admits that even things other than art objects possess an 
aura. He claims indeed that
The concept of aura which was proposed above with reference to 
historical objects may usefully be illustrated with reference to the aura 
of natural ones. [...] If, while resting on a summer afternoon, you follow 
with your eyes a  mountain range on the horizon or a  branch which 
casts its shadow over you, you experience the aura of those mountains, 
of that branch. (Benjamin, 1969, p. 5)
In this quotation, the notion of aura is expanded here in two different ways. 
On the one hand, Benjamin seems to claim that when he talks about aura, he is 
not uniquely referring to the aura of artworks, but rather to the aura of 
historical objects in general, namely any kind of objects or tools created in the 
past, including objects that are part of some tradition.8 For this reason, all 
‘images’ or artifacts of the past seem to bear the traits of aura. Aura is just like 
the patina that reveals the age of old paintings and exemplifies their belonging 
to the past. This aura, the aura of human-made objects, has primarily an 
ontological character and determines the place of the artifact in history. 
On the other hand, Benjamin also assumes that aura – that which relates the 
object to a certain place and time – can be also perceived, seen, and ‘breathed’ 
in natural objects. In this case, the aura does not simply reflect the temporal 
horizon of the object but rather the temporal and spatial horizon of perception 
itself.  What we perceive within these natural auratic objects is the remnant of 
an aura that corresponds to an original, indescribable experience, one that can 
be mediated through cult and ceremony. Our inability to fully comprehend the 
aura’s  presence and persistence gives the natural bearers of aura a  time-
resistant value. 
Extending the concept of aura in this way leads one to the disturbing 
conclusion that every object can have its aura; a  conclusion, however, that 
would imply a misreading of Benjamin’s  thought if further clarification is not 
added. As a matter of fact, it is not that every object has an aura, but that ‘every 
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human-made object’ can, including objects that are invented, modified, or 
altered by human beings. Such objects, which dispose of ‘fragments’ of aura, 
can indeed become part of some cultural tradition, enter the sphere of the cult, 
and acquire in this way some auratic value. 
This participation of objects in a cult or activities related to a cult is what Ellen 
Dissanayake (1995, 2009) calls specialization (see Davies, 2005). According to 
Dissanayake, specialization, as a process, is a common phenomenon in human 
praxis, and one that can give rise to an artistic praxis. Through the process of 
specialization, common objects with an identifiable ontology are distinguished 
from cult objects whose aura is endowed with a  value that is perceivable 
throughout space and time. This ‘aesthetic side’ of the aura is neither an 
immanent nor an arbitrary part of aura but the result of a continuous change, 
which depends on the processes, practices, and ceremonies in which the 
objects find their role. These processes, practices, and ceremonies create 
a  tradition that is responsible for the transfer of the sacred and ceremonial 
character of cult objects to art objects. Aura represents indeed a way by which 
the relationship that links an object to a cult or tradition is made visible, just 
like the object’s bond with the past. 
We can summarize our former considerations by saying that aura, according to 
Benjamin, works on two levels: (1) as an ontological guarantee proving that the 
auratic object has been created somewhere and at some time or connecting the 
object to a cult via an act of specialization; and (2) as an axiological guarantee 
of value. If this second aspect depends on the former, so  that the value of an 
auratic object resides on its ontology, is hard to say. But certainly, the aura is 
responsible for the identity of an object and proves its inalterability and 
specificity with regard to other objects.
Benjamin’s critique of mechanical reproduction (1969) as the process by which 
an original is transformed into a  copy and is thus falsified, is based on this 
assumption.  Mechanical reproduction can only give rise to ‘clones’ or replicas 
that, although being visually identical to the original, are empty, replaceable, 
and deprived of value. This repetition in terms of reproduction involves 
a weakening of the power of aura or even its destruction. 
Significantly, understanding this process is also key to explain how banal 
objects are created.  
4. The Absence of Axiological and Ontological Value
The process of banalization itself can be seen as the gradual disappearance of 
aura from an object, in both its aesthetic and axiological character, which also 
entails a loss in the aesthetic function of the object. 
Welsch’s thesis seems to play an important role here because it can account for 
our non-sensitivity and perhaps even blindness as regards banal objects. 
However, while Welsch’s  theory of the anesthetic only interprets banalization 
as an experiential process resulting from the individual’s  reception of and 
interaction with an object, Benjamin’s  conception of the aura also adds an 
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important ontological element to Welsch’s  picture, because it implies that 
banal objects are characterized by the absence of something.
From this point of view, all banal things can be seen as originally possessing an 
aura that disappeared or was weakened at some point in time. But when, and 
why? The answer is hidden in the term ‘aura’ itself. As I  have argued, aura is 
proof of the ontological and axiological uniqueness of an object, which 
originates in a  certain tradition and cult practice. Banal things, on the other 
hand, have no uniqueness and show instead a  character of anonymity, 
replaceability, triviality, and monotony which is conveyed by mechanic 
reproduction. Repetition indeed destroys uniqueness and originality and 
creates things without an identity – homogenous, deformed, and adjustable. 
Thus, while aura is created by some special and temporal constants (here and 
now), banal things are created through the repetition of these constants. 
Repetition of place can occur quite often: firstly intentionally, and then 
stereotypically when it becomes subconscious. In this sense, visiting the 
church and going to work become banal activities when repeated even though 
one is aware of these actions when doing them. They are banal because they 
are not specific, unique, or different. If someone always visits the same castle 
ruins, sits on the same chair under the same tree, and reads, this action 
becomes merely a habit and all its uniqueness fades away. To the same extent, 
a flower bouquet on Valentine’s Day, chocolates for birthdays, flowers on graves 
for anniversaries: if these are regular gestures that are repeated every year at 
the same time, they could turn into banal things. When an action is repeated, 
time is no more a purveyor of particularity, and the action becomes merely ‘one 
in a row’.
But what makes banal things different from activities, phenomena, and objects 
that belong to the sphere of everyday life? Let’s imagine a black hairgrip. There 
is probably nothing more trivial, banal, and over-familiar than a hairgrip. It is 
a  small piece of metal which is sold in packages of ten or even more pieces. 
When we lose a  hairgrip, it doesn’t matter because we have plenty of them 
(although we are often unable to find any of them when we need them!). Each 
hairgrip is very much the same as every other. 
However, when a  hairgrip features a  particular color, material, or even some 
decoration or shape, then it is distinguished and made unique and special with 
regard to the group of all the other average hairgrips. According to Mukařovský 
(1966), in this case the aesthetic function of the hairgrip takes dominance and 
makes it different from seemingly identical objects. We could say that it 
strengthens its ‘aura’. This also happens when a hairgrip, for example, is used 
by thieves or private detectives to open locks, handcuffs, etc., as it often 
happens in movies. These and other similar uses, although not necessarily 
aesthetic, make an object unique by endowing it with some significance. 
As we have seen, the ontological character of the aura is what relates an object 
to a  specific and unique space and time, while its axiological valence is 
acquired through a  process of specialization. Reproduction weakens both the 
axiological and the ontological aspects of aura. When everyday objects are 
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mechanically multiplied up to the level that the newly created product 
becomes interchangeable with all others, they lose their identity as singular 
objects and become banal, thus invisible to the recipient. 
In this sense, while aura in artworks entails the perception of both the special 
value and the uniqueness of the auratic work qua individual object – namely, 
the axiological and ontological component of aura – everyday objects have lost 
such value. In turn, banal objects are everyday objects that are deprived not 
only of their value but also of their ontological individuality as singular, 
recognizable objects. Banal things, in other words, lack both the axiological and 
the ontological dimension of aura. As a  result, they appear the closest and 
most approachable as possible to the recipient, so that the recipient does not 
even need to think about them when she uses them. Consequently, as these 
things lose their place in the recipient’s  experience, they are, so  to speak, 
condemned to die.
5. Conclusion
I  have argued that there is both an axiological and an ontological difference 
between art, everyday objects, and banal things, but it is also true that 
throughout their existence objects constantly move from one field of the 
aesthetic sphere to another. 
In this regard, when answering the question of what makes things banal, we 
do  not have to search for an element or feature that all banal things possess. 
Rather, we shall search for what all banal things lack. It is the lack of some 
quality and in particular, the lack of aura, that distinguishes these objects from 
other objects. Banal objects lack ontological structure, aesthetic function, and 
even sometimes practical function, at least according to an etymological 
understanding of the verb ‘to practice’. 
When it comes to understanding ‘how’ banal things are produced, I  have 
argued that repetition is what we should look at. But repetition only produces 
banality when the ontological integrity and identity of an object is destroyed. If 
we cannot see any difference between two seemingly identical, yet intrinsically 
different objects, then such objects start to appear trivial, and if they are 
unnoticed for too long, they become banal. 
In this sense, banal things are not valueless by nature, but their ontological 
status is so  fragile that they are constantly at risk of disappearing, as if they 
were not even present anymore. This sole fact, I  think, gives us reason to 
investigate banality aesthetically.
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